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Abstract
This study applies an institutional perspective to a current debate in social
entrepreneurship about the relative effectiveness of commercial vs non-profit
methods of building inclusive markets for the poor. While some observers argue
that for-profit ventures are needed to serve the poor on a large scale, others
express concern that commercialization causes mission drift, a phenomenon
where ventures migrate to wealthier clients over time. A multilevel analysis
of 2679 for-profit and non-profit microfinance lenders in 123 countries over
15 years supported the hypotheses that commercialization contributes to
mission drift away from market inclusivity, but that national levels of “state
fragility”moderate this effect. In countries with a low level of state fragility, it was
less costly to serve the poor, which decreased pressure on commercial actors to
shift to wealthier clients to achieve profitability. An important implication of this
finding is that institutions influence not only the number of entrepreneurs found
in a particular location but also the social impact of entrepreneurial strategies
and actions.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have recently identiﬁed a need for research that integrates the
international entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship literatures
(Zahra, Newey, & Li, 2014; Zahra, Rawhouser, Bhawe, Neubaum, &
Hayton, 2008). In their view, both bodies of literature have contributed
important insights to our understanding of entrepreneurial motivation
and performance, but gaps remain that could be addressed by integrat-
ing the ﬁndings of both ﬁelds. For instance, international entrepre-
neurship research has made inroads in describing how national
institutions and cultures impact the entrepreneurial process (Busenitz,
Gomez, & Spencer, 2000; Jones, Coviello, & Tang, 2011; McDougall &
Oviatt, 2000), but it typically focuses on ﬁnancial measures of success,
with less emphasis on the impact of entrepreneurial action on society.
Social entrepreneurship research has explored the social implications of
entrepreneurship (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010; Mair & Marti, 2006;
Peredo &McLean, 2006), but it tends to generalize its ﬁndings without
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considering national context. This divide between the
two research streams has prompted calls for a new
international social entrepreneurship approach that
explores how national differences inﬂuence the social
impact of new ventures (Zahra et al., 2014).
In response, this study applies an explicitly interna-
tional perspective to a frequently debated issue in the
social entrepreneurship literature: What are the long-
term consequences of relying on commercial actors
to advance the social goal of market inclusivity
(Agafonow, 2014; London & Hart, 2011; Prahalad,
2005; Santos, 2012)? “Market inclusivity” is the
degree to which markets are able to engage and
beneﬁt individuals who are traditionally excluded, or
even exploited, by current market systems – such as
the poor, women, and other marginalized groups
(George, McGahan, & Jaideep, 2012; Mair, Marti, &
Ventresca, 2012; Mendoza & Thelen, 2008; UNDP,
2010; USAID, 2014). Researchers from diverse ﬁelds –
not only social entrepreneurship but also base-of-the-
pyramid (London & Hart, 2011; Prahalad, 2005),
international development (Collier & Dollar, 2002;
Mendoza & Thelen, 2008), and microﬁnance (CGAP,
2004) – have come to some consensus about the
importance of inclusive markets as a tool to alleviate
poverty. From this perspective, markets may be a
powerful engine of economic growth and human
development, but large populations remain excluded
from their beneﬁts. Thus a key priority of economic
development is to extend market opportunities to
larger segments of society. According to these
researchers, entrepreneurs are central players in the
creation and proliferation of any new market and are
therefore critical to this initiative (Mendoza &
Thelen, 2008; UNDP, 2004).
Yet while academics and policymakers may agree
on the beneﬁts of inclusive markets in providing
new opportunities for the poor, and the importance
of entrepreneurs in this process, a debate still exists
about which type of entrepreneurial venture is best
suited to the task. Some observers maintain that for-
proﬁt ﬁrms should take the lead role in expanding
inclusive markets since commercial organizations
can more easily gather the resources necessary to
spread innovations to the world’s 4 billion poor
citizens (London & Hart, 2004, 2011; Prahalad,
2005). Others suggest that the cost and externalities
of serving the poor may be too high to support a
commercial model (Karnani, 2007; Santos, 2012).
For-proﬁt ﬁrms that try to pursue market inclusivity
may feel pressure to migrate toward wealthier clients
in order to generate higher revenue at less cost.
Researchers often refer to this type of migration as
“mission drift,” which they identify as one of the
primary risks of pursuing social goals using commer-
cial methods (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Ebrahim,
Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Santos, Pache, & Birkholz,
2015).
Some observers suggest that the debate about for-
proﬁt and non-proﬁt solutions persists because we
have limited empirical research on the long-term
advantages and risks of relying on commercial actors
to advance social goals (Agafonow, 2014; Kolk, Rivera-
Santos, & Rufín, 2014; Walsh, Kress, & Beyerchen,
2005). In their view, empirical support for each posi-
tion is often based on individual case studies rather
than on systematic data collection and analysis. These
authors thus call for greater large-scale investigation
to reconcile the social and commercial aspects of
social entrepreneurship.
The current study contributes to this research
agenda by empirically testing the relative ability of
for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt ventures to reach the
socially oriented goal of market inclusivity over time.
Additionally, the article develops an international
framework that adds a unique, multilevel perspective
to the debate. International entrepreneurship
research has demonstrated that all entrepreneurial
actions are embedded in the sociopolitical environ-
ment where they take place (Bowen & De Clercq,
2008; Busenitz et al., 2000; Casper & Whitley, 2004;
Jones et al., 2011; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000).
I build on this insight to propose that national
institutions may also shape the conditions that allow
commercial agents to balance ﬁrm-level proﬁtability
objectives with the wider, societal goal of building
inclusive markets.
To test this proposition, the current study develops
a longitudinal, multilevel analysis of both the ﬁrm-
level effects of commercialization and the national-
level effects of institutions on lending patterns in
the global microﬁnance industry. Results support
the hypothesis that national levels of “state fragility”
inﬂuence the market inclusivity of entrepreneurial
action. “State fragility” is the degree to which the
state is unable and/or unwilling to fulﬁll core gov-
ernment functions for the majority of its people,
including the poor (Ault & Spicer, 2014). The analy-
sis shows that commercial entrepreneurs are able to
achieve desired social outcomes at low levels of state
fragility, but donor-based non-proﬁt models repre-
sent a better strategy for providing services to the
poorest members of a community in states with a
higher level of state fragility. The irony of this
ﬁnding is that the most fragile states – which some
scholars argue have the greatest need of for-proﬁt
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ventures to generate market opportunities for the
poor on a large scale (London & Hart, 2011;
Prahalad, 2005) –may present the biggest challenges
when it comes to reaching a marginalized popula-
tion through commercial models.
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MISSION
DRIFT
Social entrepreneurship research on mission drift
(Agafonow, 2015; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ramus &
Vaccaro, 2014) provides an appropriate starting
point for examining the potential beneﬁts and risks
of using commercial methods to advance market
inclusivity. Mission drift is a phenomenon where
the pursuit of proﬁts causes socially oriented ven-
tures to prioritize business objectives over develop-
ment or social goals (Battilana & Dorado, 2010;
Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012; Dees &
Anderson, 2003; Santos et al., 2015). In the study of
business and poverty, market inclusivity is com-
monly used to identify the social impact of entrepre-
neurial action (George et al., 2012; Mair et al., 2012;
Mendoza & Thelen, 2008; Prahalad, 2005). Thus in
this research, mission drift captures the extent to
which an organization that has adopted the goal of
market inclusivity deviates from this objective over
time (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Santos et al., 2015).
International aid agencies suggest that markets are
inclusive when they include the poor and other
marginalized groups (e.g., women, youth, and indi-
genous people) on the demand side as clients and
customers and on the supply side as employees,
producers, and business owners (UNDP, 2010). How-
ever, they observe that the goal of market inclusivity
may be difﬁcult to achieve. Individuals at the base of
the economic pyramid might desire certain pro-
ducts, and might be willing to pay for them if
affordable options were available, but, for a variety
of reasons, entrepreneurs are unwilling and/or
unable to serve them (London & Hart, 2011; Mair
et al., 2012; Mendoza & Thelen, 2008).
Recent efforts by the development community
(UNDP, 2010, 2016) to increase market inclusivity in
the global banking industry illustrate this scenario.
Aid organizations have long recognized the impor-
tance of credit and other ﬁnancial services for addres-
sing the problem of global poverty. They have also
noted that banks have historically struggled to make
such products available to lower-income market seg-
ments. As Battilana and Dorado (2010) observe, low-
income clients can typically only afford small loans.
However, banks often incur the same costs for a small
loan as they do for a larger one, even though the
small loan generates lower revenue with more risk.
Thus traditional banks regularly avoid poorer popula-
tions, thereby excluding millions of low-income
individuals from the beneﬁts of the global ﬁnancial
market. In order to advance market inclusivity, some
development agencies have started to promote entre-
preneurial initiatives that improve the poor’s access
to affordable ﬁnancial products.1 These initiatives
focus primarily on microﬁnance but also include
other innovations such as cell-phone money-transfer
services and micro-insurance (UNDP, 2016).
Research on the relationship between business and
poverty has begun to look at the potential beneﬁts of
using commercial actors to improve market inclusiv-
ity (Hart, 2005; London&Hart, 2004, 2011; Prahalad,
2005). This research acknowledges that non-proﬁt
ventures have proven effective in the development
of innovative business models to serve small numbers
of customers in a single location. However, because
extreme poverty afﬂicts 4 billion individuals –
roughly two-thirds of the world’s population
(Prahalad & Hammond, 2002) – relying solely on
non-proﬁt organizations to advance market inclusiv-
ity may be unfeasible. Non-proﬁt ﬁrms that depend
on charitable donations are unlikely to reach the
billions of individuals who live in poverty around
the world. Since commercial agents can attract ﬁnan-
cial and human capital more easily than non-proﬁts,
the commercialization of innovative social models
represents an important mechanism in building
inclusive markets on a global scale (London & Hart,
2011; Prahalad, 2005).
Yet Ebrahim et al. (2014) caution that introducing
a proﬁt motive into social organizations may not
achieve this result. They suggest that when any
organization adopts a commercial orientation inde-
pendent of its stated mission, it is likely to become
dependent on proﬁts to satisfy shareholder expecta-
tions and pay for ongoing operations. This pressures
the organization to prioritize its ﬁnancial goals in
order to ensure its survival. Since pursuing a social
mission often generates less revenue (at greater cost
and risk), a commercial venture may come to shift
away frommore socially oriented activities over time
– or be forced out of business altogether.
Santos (2012) builds on the concepts of value
creation and value capture to make a similar theore-
tical argument (see also Mizik & Jacobson, 2003).
In Santos’ framework, commercial ventures maxi-
mize on value capture and satisﬁce on value crea-
tion; to do otherwise “can cause upheaval on
stakeholders and may lead to a loss of legitimacy”
(Santos, 2012: 338). According to Santos, the
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problem is that current markets often exclude the
poor precisely because the added costs and external-
ities of serving this population make it difﬁcult for
for-proﬁt ﬁrms to capture value. Thus while com-
mercial ﬁrms may start out targeting the poor, they
are likely to migrate to higher-income market seg-
ments over time.
In the sections below, I draw on these competing
arguments about the risks and beneﬁts of commercia-
lization to develop a set of hypotheses about the
relative effectiveness of for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt ﬁrms
in achieving the goal of market inclusivity. First,
I review the social entrepreneurship literature to
devise a hypothesis that allows for a direct empirical
test of the effect of commercialization on mission
drift. I then develop a multilevel, institutional frame-
work to compare this relationship in countries around
the world. These hypotheses embed entrepreneurial
actions within the national context and suggest that
the efﬁcacy of commercial ventures in achieving
desired social outcomes on a large scale may depend
on the country where these actions occur.
Commercialization and Inclusive Markets
The ﬁrst hypothesis draws on mission drift research
in the social entrepreneurship literature (Agafonow,
2014; Kent & Dacin, 2013; Mair, Battilana, &
Cardenas, 2012). Studies on the pressures that encou-
rage mission drift identify multiple mechanisms that
help explain why commercially oriented ﬁrms may
pursue more afﬂuent and advantaged customers –
even if the company’s stated mission is to serve a less
privileged customer base. For instance, poorer custo-
mers tend to have less regular income streams and
erratic purchasing patterns, are more vulnerable to
external shocks – such as natural disasters – and are
often less sophisticated consumers than wealthier
clients (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Ebrahim et al.,
2014; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Santos, 2012;
Santos et al., 2015). These factors often require that
ﬁrms invest in entirely new marketing campaigns,
organizational designs, and distribution channels
when working with the poor (Battilana & Dorado,
2010; Dees & Anderson, 2003; Santos, 2012).
Research on business and poverty has also found
that poor customers tend to live in environments
characterized by less developed market institutions.
Thus the costs involved in reaching poor individuals
are likely to be higher than the costs of serving the
wealthy, who have access to a more developed
market infrastructure (Battilana & Dorado, 2010;
London & Hart, 2004; Prahalad, 2005; Simanis,
2012). For instance, Prahalad and Hammond (2002)
showed that the costs of basic goods and services –
such as credit, phone calls, medication, and water –
were as much as 53 times higher in the shantytowns
of India, where needed infrastructure was missing,
than in the upper-class suburbs, where such infra-
structure was in place and working well. Similarly,
Ault and Spicer’s (2014) empirical analysis of com-
mercial microﬁnance around the world reveals that
the weak provisioning of property rights protection,
security, and rule of law in low-income markets
increases the institutional hazards of servicing
poorer customers, which reduces the attractiveness
of low-income markets to microﬁnance institutions.
In their grounded case study of the Bangladeshi
social enterprise BRAC, Mair et al. (2012) identiﬁed a
number of theoretical mechanisms to explain the
link between unsupportive market institutions and
the relative cost of servicing the poor and other
disadvantaged populations, such as women. For
instance, they note that the Bangladeshi legal codes
explicitly guaranteed equal property rights protection
to all citizens, but because of the weaknesses in the
judiciary system, access to this protection was often
available only to wealthy male citizens, who could
afford to bribe judicial authorities. They also found
that while Bangladesh’s constitution may have guar-
anteed universal economic autonomy, conﬂicting
local legislation often forced the poor into patrimo-
nial relationships with wealthy benefactors, thereby
limiting their free market participation. Before setting
up social enterprises to deliver dairy, poultry, iodized
salt, and other products to the poor, BRAC ﬁrst had to
develop programs to overcome the uneven applica-
tion of property rights and autonomy. For example, it
offset weak property rights protection by providing
legal literacy courses and legal assistance to help the
poor navigate the complex court system; and when
BRAC recognized that interrupted education was a
major obstacle to economic autonomy, it established
a primary school.
Given the relative costs this venture incurred in its
attempts to serve poor clients, it is perhaps not
coincidental that BRAC adopted a non-proﬁt gov-
ernance structure. Had it been a commercial venture,
it may have felt pressure to prioritize proﬁts, and it
may have been less inclined to take on the extra cost
of developing these experimental pilot programs.
Santos (2012) succinctly summarizes these ﬁndings
and in doing so provides the foundation for the ﬁrst
hypothesis of this study. He posits that if a commer-
cial venture and a non-proﬁt venture both operate in
the same industry, providing the same goods or
services to the clientele, the commercial venture will
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be more likely to pursue the higher margins of more
afﬂuent clients and will migrate to that population
over time, leaving low-income populations as the
domain of the non-proﬁt venture. This reasoning
leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Over time, mission drift away
from the goal of market inclusivity will be greater
for for-proﬁt social ventures than for non-proﬁt
social ventures.
Institutional Context
It is already well established that institutions shape
incentive structures in ways that inﬂuence the
degree and type of entrepreneurship in a particular
location (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008; Busenitz et al.,
2000; Casper, 2000; Nasra & Dacin, 2010; Spicer
et al., 2000). Yet researchers have only recently begun
to explore the implications of this ﬁnding in the
context of the world’s poorest markets (Ault & Spicer,
2014; Branzei & Abdelnour, 2010; Bruton, Ahlstrom,
& Obloj, 2008; Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Kiss, Danis, &
Cavusgil, 2012). Nevertheless, this recent scholarship
has important implications for comparative research
on the effects of institutions on entrepreneurial action
in this context. This section builds on this research to
explore how national differences impact the relation-
ship between commercial ownership and mission
drift away from the goal of market inclusivity.
As established above, the costs and externalities of
providing services to the poor are often high relative
to the costs of providing service to the wealthy. This
puts pressure on commercial ventures to move into
high-end market segments to boost their proﬁts.
International entrepreneurship research on low-
income markets extends this argument by suggest-
ing that the intensity of this pressure may depend on
national context (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Bruton et al.,
2008; Kiss et al., 2012). While the relative costs of
providing services to the poor and providing services
to the wealthy may differ sharply in some countries
(thus accentuating the risk of mission drift for
commercial ﬁrms), this difference may be less pro-
nounced in other countries (thus reducing the pres-
sure on commercial ﬁrms to move from one segment
to the other to maintain proﬁtability).
As an illustration, consider Mair et al.’s (2012)
discovery that the weak provisioning of property
rights protection and economic autonomy in Ban-
gladesh increased BRAC’s costs of serving the poor
relative to the costs of serving the wealthy, as BRAC
had to ﬁrst develop programs to overcome a weak
market infrastructure. From this example, we can
infer that, had Bangladesh possessed stronger mar-
ket-supporting institutions, there would have been
less need for BRAC to develop these initiatives on its
own. This would have reduced BRAC’s costs of
extending market opportunities to the poor. In this
scenario, BRAC may have had less need for a non-
proﬁt orientation in order to ensure that it
remained focused on its core mission. On the other
hand, had the Bangladeshi institutions been even
weaker – or non-existent – BRAC may have had to
make an even greater investment in market infra-
structure in order to reach the poor. In this type of
failed state, even a non-proﬁt enterprise such as
BRAC might not be able to reach the country’s
poorest inhabitants.
Recent work on the concept of state fragility pro-
vides an important framework for extending Mair
et al.’s (2012) argument across national borders. Ault
and Spicer (2014) deﬁne “state fragility” as the degree
to which state power is unable and/or unwilling to
fulﬁll core government functions for the majority of
its people, including the poor. These authors used the
concept to explore how the national context
impacted the institutional hazards of transferring the
commercial microﬁnance business model across the
world’s poorest countries. They found that countries
characterized by high levels of state fragility increased
lender operating costs and decreased capacity to raise
capital.
Ault and Spicer’s (2014) work supports and
extends Mair et al.’s (2012) arguments about the
impact of institutions on the relative costs of serving
the poor. For instance, Ault and Spicer’s research also
demonstrates the importance of property rights and
autonomy protection in facilitating entrepreneurial
action in low-income markets. However, they also
identify additional factors – such as the ability of
governments to control violence and to enact a
strong rule of law – as important aspects of state
fragility that inﬂuence the costs of serving the poor.
For example, Ault and Spicer (2014) show that the
breakdown of national security institutions in fragile
states leads to intense competition by informal
actors for the same low-income clients. Because
informal individuals play by a different set of rules,
they are often more competitive and can force
formal, legitimate entrepreneurs out of the market-
place. Moreover, the lack of a strong rule of law in
fragile states forces any entrepreneur that serves the
poor to invest an inordinate amount of resources in
staying formal (see also De Soto, 1989), thus redu-
cing the entrepreneur’s ability to extract proﬁts from
low-income markets.
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The argument that institutional contexts moder-
ate the effect of commercialization on mission drift
resonates with the basic ﬁndings in international
entrepreneurship on how the processes and out-
comes of entrepreneurship differ across borders
(Bowen & De Clercq, 2008; Busenitz et al., 2000;
Jones et al., 2011; Kiss & Danis, 2008). Analyses of
national differences in entrepreneurial systems
have demonstrated that institutions contribute to
both the levels and the proﬁtability of entrepre-
neurship (Busenitz et al., 2000; Jones et al., 2011;
Stephan, Uhlaner, & Stride, 2015), as well as the
strategies and outcomes of entrepreneurial activity
across nations (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008). On the
relative efﬁcacy of commercial vs non-proﬁt means
of achieving social entrepreneurial goals, an inter-
national entrepreneurship perspective cautions
against the universal argument that commercially
oriented ventures will have the same impact on
society, regardless of the situation. Instead, this
comparative framework suggests that the social
consequences of commercial ventures may differ
depending on the national institutional systems in
which they are embedded.
Ault and Spicer (2014) were primarily interested in
the impact of state fragility on the ﬁnancial perfor-
mance of entrepreneurs in low-income markets. But
an international social entrepreneurship framework
also suggests that this measure is likely to have both a
direct effect on mission drift away from market inclu-
sivity and amoderating effect that explains the relative
difference of commercial and non-proﬁt ventures in
the pursuit of an inclusive-market strategy. The direct
effect recognizes that all socially oriented ventures
may ﬁnd it more challenging to reach the poor in
fragile states, and may ultimately shift to wealthier
clients over time. The moderating effect incorporates
the ﬁnding in social entrepreneurship research that
commercial ﬁrms must prioritize value capture, thus
making them more sensitive to the effect of institu-
tions on the cost differential between wealthy and
poor clients. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the level of state fragi-
lity in a country, the greater the level of mission
drift away from the goal of market inclusivity in
that country over time.
Hypothesis 3: State fragility will positively moder-
ate the relationship between proﬁt status and mis-
sion drift away from the goal of market inclusivity,
such that mission drift will be greater for for-proﬁt




This study tests the three hypotheses through a long-
itudinal, multilevel analysis that looks at the ﬁrm-
level effects of commercialization and national-level
effects of state fragility on the degree to which micro-
ﬁnance lenders drift away from the goal of market
inclusivity over time. “Microﬁnance” refers to a
model of provisioning small loans to the poor (Ault
& Spicer, 2014; Bruton, Khavul, & Chavez, 2011;
Khavul, 2010). Social entrepreneurship authors and
development agencies have identiﬁed microﬁnance
as a global industry that has adopted the goal of
market inclusivity by extending the beneﬁts of global
ﬁnancial markets to the poor and other marginalized
groups that have traditionally been excluded from
these opportunities (Kent & Dacin, 2013; Mair et al.,
2012; Mendoza & Thelen, 2008; UNDP, 2010, 2016).
Microﬁnance now serves almost 100 million poor
borrowers in more than 100 developing countries
worldwide (MIX, 2015).
An early split in the industry into for-proﬁt and non-
proﬁt lenders (Morduch, 2000) provides a unique
opportunity to observe the relative differences in the
performance of each type of venture in its pursuit of
market inclusivity. While most lenders initially uti-
lized a non-proﬁt model that relied on donations and
grants for funding, some organizations realized that
demand for small loans was growing faster than their
ability to secure donations. They began to explore the
possibility of commercialization as a way to raise
additional funding (Accion, 2016). In 1992, the devel-
opment agency Accion International transitioned one
of its afﬁliates, BancoSol in Bolivia, into a commercial
business that would pay dividends high enough to
attract commercial investments. In 1994, BancoSol
began selling microloan-backed securities to investors
in the United States; and in 1997, it issued its ﬁrst
dividend of US$0.45 per share on $1.1 million in
proﬁts. Accion soon began to transition other partners
to the commercial model. In 2007, it brought its
Mexican afﬁliate, Compartamos Banco, through the
industry’s ﬁrst IPO, raising over $400 million (CGAP,
2007; MicroCapital, 2008).
Similar commercial experiments were also taking
place in South Asia. In 1998, social entrepreneur
Vikram Akula launched SKS Microﬁnance in India.
By 2005, SKS had earned enough revenue to seek
venture capital. In 2006, Akula sold 34% of SKS
to Sequoia Capital, one of Silicon Valley’s most
prestigious venture capital ﬁrms, for $11.5 million
(Akula, 2011). In 2010, SKS became the industry’s
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second IPO, raising $344 million from prominent
investors such as George Soros, Morgan Stanley, and
J.P. Morgan (Chen, Rasmussen, Reille, & Rozas,
2010). Commercialization soon spread through the
industry, rapidly extending ﬁnancial services around
the globe. By 2013, roughly 60% of all borrowers
were receiving their loans from commercial lenders
(MIX, 2015).
Yet while commercialization has facilitated rapid
scaling, it also raises questions about whether for-
proﬁt lenders are pursuing the same objectives as
their non-proﬁt equivalents. Some observers have
argued that commercialization has pushed microﬁ-
nance lenders “upstream” to provide loans for higher-
end goods – such as ﬂat-screen TVs, sound systems,
and cameras – to the middle classes (Bloomberg
Business, 2007). The analysis presented below tests
this claim over time and around the world to general-
ize more broadly about the degree to which non-
proﬁt and commercial entrepreneurial ventures are
able to pursue the goal of market inclusivity. The ﬁrst
hypothesis introduced in this study would ﬁnd sup-
port if for-proﬁt commercial microﬁnance lenders are
shown to lend to a signiﬁcantly wealthier client base
than non-proﬁt lenders. The second and third
hypotheses would ﬁnd support if this difference is
shown to be affected by national levels of state
fragility.
Sample
All microﬁnance data used in this analysis are from
the Microﬁnance Information Exchange (MIX,
2015), which scholars have identiﬁed as the most
accurate and reliable collection of data on the micro-
ﬁnance industry (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Khavul, 2010).
The data set used included data from 2679 lenders in
123 countries. While the study covered 15 years,
from 1999 to 2013, the average lender lifespan was
5.88 years. Therefore the ﬁnal sample included
15,752 unique observations (2679 lenders × 5.88
years).
Dependent Variable
To determine the degree to which microﬁnance
lenders advanced the goal of building inclusive
markets for the poor, the study used the most
common measure for mission drift in the microﬁ-
nance literature: “Average Loan Balance per Bor-
rower/GNI per Capita” (Armendariz & Szafarz,
2011; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Cull & Morduch,
2007; Gonzalez-Vega & Villafani-Ibarnegaray, 2011;
Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-
Nieto, 2014). Various scholars have proposed this
measure as a useful proxy for the borrowers’ wealth,
based on the logic that richer clients can afford larger
loans than poorer clients (Mersland & Strøm, 2010).
The study followed the precedent in the literature of
dividing loan size by GNI per capita, which standar-
dizes the measure for more accurate cross-national
comparisons (Gonzalez & Meyer, 2009).
Independent Variables
Commercialization
MIX identiﬁes each lender as either for-proﬁt or non-
proﬁt based on legal registration. I assigned all non-
proﬁts a value of 0 and all for-proﬁts a value of 1.
State fragility
Following Ault and Spicer (2014), the study opera-
tionalized state fragility using Kaufmann, Kraay, &
Mastruzzi’s (2013) six “Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators:” (1) Voice and Accountability; (2) Political
Stability and Absence of Violence; (3) Government
Effectiveness; (4) Regulatory Quality; (5) Rule of Law;
and (6) Control of Corruption. Ault and Spicer
(2014: 1827) recommend the Kaufmann data set
over other fragility measures “because it has gone
through the most rigorous tests for reliability and
validity of the measures commonly used to capture
similar concepts of state capability.”
Ault and Spicer (2014) suggest combining the six
dimensions into a single measure since they are all
indicators of the multidimensional state fragility
factor. Before following this advice, however, I ran a
conﬁrmatory factor analysis on the 2013 measures.
This analysis produced a CFI of 0.98 and an SRMR of
0.02, suggesting a strong ﬁt.2 Moreover, tests of the
hypotheses that a relationship exists between each
observed variable and the underlying state fragility
construct were signiﬁcant at 0.99 conﬁdence levels,
thus indicating the presence of a single factor.
Microﬁnance is found almost exclusively in less
developed countries. This fact caused the Kaufmann
measure to skew left. I tested for the possibility of a
non-normal distribution by running the model with
both the raw state fragility scores and the logarith-
mic transformation of these scores.3 The trans-
formed variable signiﬁcantly improved the model
ﬁt (p < 0.05). The analysis therefore used this trans-
formation. For ease of interpretation, the model
reverse-codes the measure: a higher score on the
Kaufmann measure indicates a more capable state;
in this study, a higher number indicates a more
fragile state.
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Control Variables
National level
The ﬁrst two controls were for the size of the national
microﬁnance market. Larger markets may create
economies of scale and reduce the costs of serving
the poor. To capture this, the analysis included a log
of the country’s population (to capture the number of
people in the market) and GNI per capita (to capture
their relative income). Both measures came from the
World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”
(WDI) (World Bank, 2013).
Next, the study controlled for the national level of
urbanization, which was also sourced from the WDI
indicators. Servicing the poor in rural areas is likely
to create additional costs for the microﬁnance lender
(Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2011).
The analysis also controlled for economic openness
using “openness to trade” from the World Bank’s
“Doing Business Database” (Doing Business, 2013).
Greater government intervention may also increase
the cost of serving the poor (Cull et al., 2011).
The next two country-level controls captured the
degree of competition from other actors. Competi-
tion from traditional banks may push microﬁnance
lenders into poorer markets; I thus included the
World Bank’s measure of domestic credit provided
by the banking sector, as a percentage of GDP. In
contrast, competition from aid agencies may push
microﬁnance into wealthier segments; I thus
included a measure for “Net Ofﬁcial Development
Assistance Received per Capita, Current US$” from
the WDI data base.
The ﬁnal country-level control was the number
and magnitude of civil events, which came from the
“Total Summed Magnitude of All Societal Major
Episodes of Political Violence” measure in the Polity
IV database (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013). Ault
and Spicer (2014) recommend this control for stu-
dies that include the effects of state fragility in order
to capture the possibility of sudden changes in a
country’s fragility score over time.
Firm level
All ﬁrm-level controls came from the MIX (2015)
data set. First, the study controlled for the lender’s
dependence on shareholders for capital. Commercial
lenders with access to other sources of capital may
feel less pressure to maximize shareholder value, and
may be less inclined to drift away from serving the
poor. The model thus included two alternative
sources of capital: savings accounts (as indicated by
the log of the lender’s total savings deposits) and
debt (captured by the lender’s debt-to-equity ratio).
Next, the study controlled for progressive lending,
one of the most common alternative hypotheses
(other than mission drift) for why lenders might give
out larger loans (Armendariz & Szafarz, 2011). In
microﬁnance, lenders may extend small loans initi-
ally, and then give progressively larger loans as clients
demonstrate responsible borrowing. Older lenders
may therefore provide larger loans without necessa-
rily drifting from the goal of market inclusivity. MIX
includes an age indicator (new, young, mature),
which I used to create a dummy for lender age.
The study also included two controls for lender
size: total assets and total personnel. Finally, the
model included lender ﬁxed effects; the thousands
of organizations in the sample may each possess
idiosyncrasies that impact mission drift.
Robustness Checks
While average loan size may be the most common
measure in microﬁnance for mission drift away from
market inclusivity (Copestake, 2007; Mersland &
Strøm, 2010), there have been few empirical tests of
the variable’s measurement validity (Armendariz &
Szafarz, 2011). The study therefore added three robust-
ness checks to ensure that the results were not sensi-
tive to the measure of mission drift. The ﬁrst two have
also been used in the microﬁnance literature to cap-
ture mission drift, albeit less frequently than average
loan size (Mersland& Strøm, 2010). The ﬁrst of these is
“Percent of Female Borrowers.” In developing coun-
tries, women are often excluded from traditional
market systems. A lender that shifts to male clients
may therefore be migrating away from a development
goal of market inclusivity (Mair et al., 2012). The
second measure sometimes found in the literature is
loan delinquencies. Mendoza and Thelen (2008) point
out that serving low-income populations may not be
sufﬁcient to advance the goal of market inclusivity if
the poor then become worse off. In microﬁnance,
delinquencies have been proposed as a way to deter-
mine whether market activity is beneﬁcial (Cull,
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009). I captured this
variable using theMIXmeasure “portfolio at risk > 90
days.” Third, I combined all three variables (loan size,
percentage of female borrowers, and delinquencies)
into a single measure of mission drift.
The study also included a robustness check for
state fragility, running the model with and without
a variable for the country’s microﬁnance regulations.
The preference for state fragility in this study, rather
than regulatory codes, was based on Ault and
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Spicer’s (2014) observation that legal frameworks are
often less useful for making meaningful predictions
in low-income settings. Ault and Spicer (2014) note
that even if a particular law exists, there is no
guarantee it will be followed or enforced (see also
Portes & Haller, 2005). They proposed state fragility
as a more reliable institutional indicator that cap-
tures the underlying capability of the state to create
and enforce effective regulations. To test this claim,
I ran the model both with and without the
Economist Intelligence Unit’s (2013) “Global Micro-
scope on the Microﬁnance Business Environment.”
This index includes a small number of countries
relative to the overall sample (55 vs 123), which
signiﬁcantly hurt the model ﬁt when the measure
was included.4 The model therefore did not use the
measure as a control in the primary analysis, but
added it as a robustness check.
Data Analysis
The analysis used random coefﬁcient modeling
(RCM) for multiple reasons. First, the international
business literature has speciﬁcally identiﬁed RCM as
an appropriate technique for testing multilevel the-
ories that look at cross-level interactions between
ﬁrm and national effects (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, &
Mathieu, 2007; Peterson, Arregle, & Martin, 2012).
Second, RCM can be adapted to capture change over
time by inserting a dummy variable for time as the
ﬁrst level of the model and then testing how the
predictor variables impact the variance in the rela-
tionship between time and the dependent variable
(Ployhart, 2005). This method is therefore well sui-
ted for analyzing mission drift, a long-term process
that occurs over time (Battilana & Dorado, 2010;
Ebrahim et al., 2014). Finally, I tested the relative ﬁt
of RCM compared with OLS regression using a like-
lihood ratio test (critical X2 with 3 df = 7.82). This
test was signiﬁcant (p < 0.001), which further sup-
ported the choice of RCM for this analysis.
The longitudinal RCM used in this study followed
Ployhart’s (2005: 813) “model-building sequence for
hierarchical models.” The ﬁrst step in the sequence
was to estimate a simple equation of the dependent
variable on time, without taking into account ﬁrm-
or country-level effects. This step established a base-
line statistic to determine whether subsequent steps
improved the model ﬁt. Because RCM is a maximum
likelihood estimation method, it uses −2 Log Like-
lihood (−2LL) to measure model ﬁt. The baseline
likelihood for this analysis was 118,349.64.
The second step in the sequence was to allow the
intercept and slope of the regression equation
estimated in the ﬁrst step to become random effects.
Signiﬁcant reductions in the −2LL indicate that the
effects of time are nested in the ﬁrm and national
levels of analysis. This step reduced the likelihood to
113,313.10, an improvement of 5036.54, which was
statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.001). The third step
was to determine the error structure of the model.
Taking the log of loan size reduced the likelihood to
10,694.37, an improvement of 102,618.74, which
was signiﬁcant (p < 0.001). The transformed depen-
dent variable was thus incorporated into the model.
I also tried controls for autoregressive, unstructured,
and other error structures. However, in these
attempts, the model failed to converge; alternative
error structures were therefore not incorporated in
the ﬁnal model. The ﬁnal step was to add the
individual predictor variables into the model – ﬁrst
the control variables and then the hypothesized
variables.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correla-
tion matrices. Due to the size of the matrix, the table
is divided into two sections. Table 1a includes all the
independent variables, while Table 1b includes the
year-over-year correlations for average loan size.
Table 1b indicates high year-over-year correlations.
The RCM literature notes that this is common in
longitudinal analysis, since the effects of time are
nested in ﬁrm and country (Ployhart, 2005).
As noted previously, however, controls for alterna-
tive error structures failed to converge and were thus
not incorporated into the analysis.
Table 2 presents the results of the RCM. Model 1
presents the baseline test of time on mission drift.
Model 2 shows the control variables, and Model 3
presents the hypothesis tests.
The ﬁrst hypothesis predicts that commercialization
will increase the risk of mission drift away from
market inclusivity. As shown in Table 2, the interac-
tion effect of time X proﬁt status was positive and
signiﬁcant (b = 0.03; p = 0.05), thus providing
support for the hypothesis.5 The second hypothesis
predicts that state fragility will also increase the risk of
mission drift away from market inclusivity over time.
As shown in Table 2, the effect of state fragility on the
growth of average loan size was positive and signiﬁ-
cant (b = 0.04; p = 0.01); this hypothesis was there-
fore also supported. The third hypothesis predicts that
state fragility will magnify the relationship between
for-proﬁt status and mission drift. As shown in the
table, the effects of the interaction between state
fragility and proﬁt status on the growth in average
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Table 2 Multilevel random coefficient model predicting microfinance mission drift
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Std. Error z – value Coeff. Std. Error z – value Coeff. Std. Error z – value
SINGLE-LEVEL EFFECTS
Level 1 (Time)
Time 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.05 0.07 0.81 0.09 0.07 1.40
Level 2 (Firm)
Depositsa 0.01 0.00 12.13*** −0.03 0.01 −1.91†
Debt to Equitya 0.04 0.00 9.90*** 0.06 0.01 5.69***
Age 1 (Young) 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.03 4.08***
Age 2 (Young) 0.03 0.01 2.94** 0.15 0.03 5.41***
Assetsa 0.20 0.03 5.82*** 0.46 0.11 4.02***
Personnela −0.01 0.00 −2.53* −0.02 0.01 −2.25*
Firm Fixed Effects −0.02 0.00 −3.82*** −0.04 0.01 −2.82**
Profit Status −0.01 0.14 −0.05
Level 3 (Country)
Population (millions) −0.01 0.01 −2.04* 0.00 0.00 −1.43
GNI Per Capitaa −0.16 0.02 −10.31*** −0.15 0.04 −4.24***
Urbanization 0.03 0.01 4.90*** 0.00 0.00 0.50
Openness to Trade 0.01 0.00 5.59*** 0.01 0.01 1.87†
Bank Depth −0.01 0.00 −3.60*** −0.02 0.01 −2.84**
International Aid (millions) −0.03 0.01 −3.51*** −0.02 0.02 −0.71
Violence −0.02 0.01 −2.85** −0.04 0.01 −2.59**
State Fragilitya −0.37 0.14 −2.64**
CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS
Country/Organization
State Fragilitya X Profit Status −0.24 0.16 −1.51
Organization/Time
Time X Depositsa 0.01 0.00 6.21*** 0.01 0.00 6.09***
Time X Debt to Equitya −0.03 0.01 −2.31* −0.03 0.01 −2.10*
Time X Age 1 (Young) −0.01 0.00 −4.05*** −0.01 0.00 −3.74***
Time X Age 2 (Mature) −0.01 0.00 −4.26*** −0.01 0.00 −3.75***
Time X Assetsa −0.04 0.01 −3.85*** −0.04 0.01 −3.40***
Time X Personnela 0.02 0.01 1.85† 0.02 0.01 1.87†
Time X Firm Fixed Effects 0.00 0.00 1.32 0.00 0.00 1.41
Time X Proﬁt Status 0.03 0.02 1.98*
Country/Time
Time X Population (millions) 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.60
Time X GNI Per Capitaa 0.00 0.00 −0.79 0.00 0.00 −0.52
Time X Urbanization 0.00 0.00 1.48 0.03 0.02 1.78†
Time X Openness to Trade 0.01 0.01 1.70† 0.00 0.00 0.05
Time X Bank Depth 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.00 0.00 1.44
Time X International Aid (millions) 0.00 0.00 −0.97 0.00 0.00 −0.98
Time X Violence 0.03 0.02 1.78† 0.00 0.00 1.12
Time X State Fragilitya 0.04 0.02 2.56*
Country/Organization/Time
Time X State Fragilitya X Proﬁt Status 0.04 0.02 2.26*
Constant 0.47 0.02 22.98*** 1.99 0.25 7.81*** 1.22 0.55 2.21*
−2 Log Likelihood 12,386.69 7536.03 7328.73
Wald X2 0.81 1119.23*** 1402.17***
Notes: Hypothesized effects are in bold; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; † p < 0.10.
aLogarithmic transformation.
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loan size was positive and signiﬁcant (b = 0.04;
p = 0.02), thus supporting the third hypothesis.
Table 3 illustrates the moderating effect of state
fragility on the relationship between commercializa-
tion and mission drift in microﬁnance. This table
lists the 20 most fragile states and the 20 least fragile
states found in the MIX database, according to the
Kaufmann et al. (2013) governance indicators. It
then shows the average loan balance per borrower/
GNI per capita for the commercial lenders found in
the database for each country in 2013. As shown
here, commercial lenders in the most fragile states
dispersed loans that were, on average, 1.88 times the
average income in that country. In contrast, lenders
in the least fragile states dispersed loans that were,
on average, 0.74 times the national income level,
indicating a poorer client base.
Robustness Checks
The robustness checks supported the use of average
loan size as a measure of mission drift.6 When I used
“percent female borrowers” in place of loan size,
the effect of state fragility and fragility X proﬁt
status remained signiﬁcant at 0.05 signiﬁcance levels.
When I included “portfolio at risk > 90 days,” the
effect of proﬁt status and state fragility X proﬁt status
both remained signiﬁcant at 0.05 signiﬁcance levels.
When I combined all three indicators of mission drift
into a single factor, proﬁt status and state fragility X
proﬁt status remained signiﬁcant at 0.01 signiﬁcance
levels. The robustness checks also supported the argu-
ment that state fragility, and not legal codes, inﬂuence
mission drift away frommarket inclusivity. When the
Economist Intelligence Unit’s (2013) regulatory fra-
meworks measure was included, proﬁt status and
fragility X proﬁt status remained signiﬁcant at 0.10
signiﬁcance levels, but neither the “regulations” vari-
able nor regulations X proﬁt status was signiﬁcant.
DISCUSSION
The international social entrepreneurship frame-
work developed in this article makes several contri-
butions to the study of social entrepreneurship and
the study of international entrepreneurship. First,
the multilevel analysis of lending patterns in a data
set of 2679 for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt microﬁnance
lenders in 123 countries over 15 years provides a
large-scale, longitudinal empirical test of a key
Table 3 Loan balance per borrower/GNI per capita for 20 most and 20 least fragile statesa
20 Developing Countries with
Most Fragile Statesa
Loan Balance per Borrower/
GNI per Capitab
20 Developing Countries
with Least Fragile Statesa
Loan Balance per Borrower/
GNI per Capitab
Afghanistan 1.83 Zambia 1.02
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 5.77 Albania 0.64
South Sudan 1.49 Senegal 0.25
Yemen 0.27 Mongolia 3.01
Zimbabwe 1.79 Armenia 0.52
Tajikistan 2.06 Mexico 0.31
Nigeria 0.70 El Salvador 0.91
Pakistan 0.25 Rwanda 1.28
Burundi 3.99 Serbia 0.34
Haiti 0.93 Suriname 0.16
Cameroon 2.20 Brazil 0.07
Bangladesh 0.22 Jamaica 0.23
Ethiopia 0.49 Panama 0.93
Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 2.56 Ghana 1.35
Madagascar 1.70 Montenegro 0.22
Mali 4.02 Romania 0.93
Laos 1.86 Georgia 1.06
Kyrgyzstan 2.15 South Africa 0.15
Liberia 0.86 Poland 0.99
Cambodia 2.40 Chile 0.48
Average 1.88 Average 0.74
aAverage of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2013).
bSource: MIX (2015)
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debate in the literature about the beneﬁts and risks
of commercial methods for advancing the goal of
market inclusivity (Agafonow, 2014; London &Hart,
2011; Prahalad, 2005; Santos, 2012). This analysis
shows that for-proﬁt, socially oriented organizations
are more likely to drift away from the goal of market
inclusivity over time, thus suggesting a limitation to
the broad claim that commercial ventures provide
the best opportunity for rapidly expanding market
opportunities to the billions of poor individuals
currently excluded from the global economy
(London & Hart, 2011; Prahalad, 2005).
However, by integrating the international entre-
preneurship literature into this debate (Busenitz
et al., 2000; Kiss et al., 2012), the study makes
a second contribution by introducing an institu-
tional contingency. While commercialization may
be a risky strategy for advancing socially desirable
goals in many circumstances, under the right condi-
tions, it may be an effective method for reaching
scale in the world’s poorest markets. In the analysis,
less fragile states were shown to provide the institu-
tional conditions that lowered the relative cost of
servicing the poor, thus reducing the need for for-
proﬁt ventures to migrate into wealthier markets
over time to survive. This ﬁnding suggests a new
way to think about the relationship between for-
proﬁt and non-proﬁt social ventures. The current
debate focuses on whether for-proﬁt models are more
effective than non-proﬁt models in the delivery of
needed goods and services to the poor. An interna-
tional social entrepreneurship perspective suggests
the need to ﬁnd complementarities between the two
models and match the appropriate strategy with the
location where it is most likely to achieve the desired
goals (see Ault & Spicer, 2010).
The irony highlighted by this ﬁnding is that the
same fragile states that tend to have themost poverty,
and thus the strongest need for commercial methods
to reach the poor on a large scale (Prahalad, 2005),
also appear to have the greatest differences in the
costs of servicing the poor relative to servicing the
wealthy. In these locations, there is an increased
likelihood that commercial strategies will result in
mission drift rather than greater market inclusivity.
This ﬁnding leads to a series of important questions
about whether low-income markets in fragile states
can be reached at all through commercialmethods, or
if moderating conditions exist that will help ventures
to workmore effectively in hostile institutional envir-
onments. For instance, future researchersmay wish to
explore ways for for-proﬁt ventures to proactively
manage the fragile state to prevent mission drift.
The framework developed here also contributes
to the international entrepreneurship literature
(Busenitz et al., 2000; Jones et al., 2011;
McDougall & Oviatt, 2000). Scholars have begun
to recognize that this research tends to focus on the
impact of national institutions on the proﬁtability
levels of entrepreneurial ﬁrms across national
boundaries, with less emphasis on the social con-
sequences; they are thus working to address this
gap. For instance, Stephan et al. (2015) look at
whether supportive institutions would increase
the number of social entrepreneurs found in a
particular location. Bowen and De Clercq (2008)
point out that an important direction for interna-
tional entrepreneurship research is examining how
institutions shape the consequences of the ﬁrm’s
actions after the decision to launch a new venture
has been made. The impact of national institutions
on the ability of social entrepreneurs to achieve
ﬁrm-level proﬁtability goals and social measures of
success therefore represents an important new
research direction.
One limitation to any analysis of low-income
markets stems from the challenge of gathering reli-
able data in developing countries (Kolk et al., 2014).
In the current study, this issue was clear in the use of
the MIX data. MIX is frequently cited as the most
used and most accurate dataset to track the micro-
ﬁnance industry (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Khavul, 2010).
However, in the absence of reliable government
data, MIX must rely on self-reporting. This intro-
duces the possibility of reporting bias, where certain
types of ﬁrms systematically choose not to disclose a
variable used in the study (Bauchet & Morduch,
2009). The longitudinal RCM used in this study
provided one solution to the issue. Bliese and
Ployhart (2002: 365) state that, “one of the strengths
of RCM is that the missing data pose no particular
problems in terms of estimation.” Since the method
compares the lenders that do report to the database
to themselves year over year, robust parameters can
still be estimated from the available sample. How-
ever, subsequent studies may need to look for addi-
tional sources of data in order to broaden the
applicability of this research.
An additional limitation of the study was the
dichotomous classiﬁcation of social ventures as for-
proﬁts and non-proﬁts. Some ventures are beginning
to experiment with alternative “hybrid” governance
models such as L3C or CIC (Ebrahim et al., 2014).
However, the MIX data set does not explicitly iden-
tify these legal forms as a category separate from the
non-proﬁt/for-proﬁt designation. Future research
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may be necessary to reconcile these new types of
corporations with more traditional forms.
A ﬁnal limitation of the study is its reliance on
large-scale empirical analysis, which only considers
aggregate data. The results do not suggest that
individual ﬁrms are simply unable to develop strate-
gies to manage the tension between proﬁts and
impact; rather, on average, the pressure to succumb
to mission drift is strong in some environments. The
current debate in the literature over the power of
mission drift suggested a need to test the issue on a
large scale. An important task for future research will
be to examine individual ﬁrms through case analysis
in order to identify ﬁrm-based strategies that might
also inﬂuence the relationship between commercia-
lization and mission drift.
Despite these limits, the study contributes to the
research by providing a large-scale empirical analysis
that applies the international entrepreneurship lit-
erature to a research question that has traditionally
fallen within the domain of social entrepreneurship.
Further research will be necessary to consider all the
ways that institutions impact how ventures pursue
social goals, but in the meantime this study makes a
unique contribution: it suggests that the opportu-
nity to commercialize innovative non-proﬁt models
and still serve a similar low-income market segment
may be tied to the particular institutional context in
which this service is provided.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Andrew Spicer, Becky Reuber, and three anon-
ymous reviewers for their insights and guidance
throughout this project. Some funding for article pre-
paration and for open-access dissemination was pro-
vided by the Centre for Social and Sustainable
Innovation under a donation from Goldcorp Inc. An
earlier version of this article received feedback in the
Junior Faculty and Doctoral Student Paper Develop-
ment Workshop on International Entrepreneurship
sponsored by CU Denver’s CIBER and the Jabs Center
for Entrepreneurship, and the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
NOTES
1The goal of improving financial access for lower-
income customers is also referred to as “financial
inclusion” (Dev, 2006; UNDP, 2016). This study will
use the more encompassing “market inclusion,” which
is the term employed in the broader management
literature (see Mair et al., 2012).
2Researchers also use X2 and RMSEA to test fit.
However, these measures are sensitive to sample size
and are therefore not recommended for samples less
than 250 (Iacobucci, 2010).
3Before taking the log, I added the minimum value to
each score to make all values positive.
4The inclusion of this variable increased the − 2LL by
28,326.62, indicating a poorer fit.
5The implication of this coefficient is that, over the 15
years of the study, the typical for-profit firm will migrate
to loans that are 1.57 times the size of those offered by
non-profits (e0.03*15). The combined practical
significance of commercialization and state fragility
from a cross-sectional perspective is illustrated in Table 3.
6After 2011, many lenders stopped reporting
“percent female borrowers” and “portfolio at risk,”
preventing the model from converging when 2012
and 2013 were included. Therefore, robustness checks
include the years 1999–2011.
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